Time, Gender and Adam

Is essentialism the same thing as the search for origins? I would argue that from a linear standpoint, and as the product of one: yes it is. This comes from the original creation story in Genesis of a world created by the Abrahamic God not just in sequence, but with an intentional form. But it should also be noted that this framework can include ‘evolutionary’ lines of thinking, those under the rubric of science and empiricism. In other words, when speaking of a linear view I would like to include not only the Judeo-Christian view of time (which would also contain a certain amount of eschatology, that is an expected end-point in time in the future), but also the post-Enlightenment thinking, in the field of Religion beginning in the 19th century, for example figures such as Tylor and Frazer).

So, what does this have to do with the physical Adam? I think that an intentional, original form should be taken into account, but also the notion of the fall. Although that should not be limited to the Christian account and reading of the fall. In Boyarin’s article the fall and physicality of this original human (whether or not Adam was by default male is not important just yet), is discussed in terms of two streams of Feminist thought linked to early Christianity and formative Rabbinic Judaism. That is the materialist feminist Monique Wittig (‘For there is no sex. There is but the sex that is oppressed and the sex that oppresses’, 118) and the early Christian concept of the original spirit created called Adam, based on Gen 1:26-28; and the contrast of Luce Irigaray’s view of inescapable gender and the prevailing thought in Judaism of the original hermaphrodite (128 and on). In terms of the two religious traditions, the fundamental difference lies in the idea of what the fall means, for the Christians (for example Paul Gal 3:26-29*) the fall was into corporeality; whereas in the Jewish tradition the physical body and organization of life around the genders did not exclude the members from spiritual life (although women were limited to the domestic sphere).

What does this view of the past have to do with gender? First off, I think that it would unreasonable to apply any progressive view of gender to texts from the first century CE. BUT what is important here, I think, is that there is a distinction between the two religious traditions and the feminists. For the traditions, I would argue that there seems to be the continual presence of the past in the present, but as an ideal (which, needless to say, is removed). In the case of feminism, I think that the scholarship and political thought is searching for an unknown original form to humanity. The desired form is known, but its shape isn’t clear. In other words, either some fundamental lack of difference or specific difference, both of which lead to a certain amount of oppression. That is undeniable. The past then, is important for feminism as both the record of oppression, but I suspect also the notion that the oppression is not a necessary feature of social life. That maybe it was in some way accidental.

* I think that this article is limited by the fact that it does not attempt to take a larger context into account in terms of the early Christian texts. Specifically, in discussing Paul’s notion of transcending gender (even if it an androgyne that is by default male), Boyarin does not take into account the high level of eschatology in early Christianity. Simply put, the expectation that the end was imminent is more informative than the notion of what Adam was. I think that any notion of Adam was not something thought over, but something taken as ‘fact’.